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THE NONPROFIT HEALTH CARE 
CORPORATlON REFORM ACT OF 
1980* 
David L. Hollister** 
Patience A. Drake*** 
Blue Cross/Blue Shield (the "Blues") was created as a tax-
exempt, "charitable and benevolent" organization1 by specific 
enabling legislation, Michigan Public Acts 108 and 109 of 1939. 
It was designed to assure that poor folks received health care 
and, more importantly at that time, that physicians and hospi-
tals got paid. The Blues, with its unique tax-free and semi-pub-
lic status, quietly became the predominant third party payor 
health insurer in Michigan. In 1980, they represented a $2.35 
billion dollar business and, in addition, processed $1.45 billion 
dollars for the Federal Medicare program. They insured 5.3 mil-
lion Michigan residents (over sixty percent of the market) and, 
because of their size and control of the market, dictated health 
policy in this state. 
In recent years, Blue Cross/Blue Shield has been the subject 
of considerable controversy. Its critics charge the non-profit, tax-
exempt corporation with being unduly secretive, arrogantly un-
responsive to consumer interest and not vigorous in its cost con-
tainment efforts. These criticisms, along with a variety of other 
factors, led to the legislative ref omi I am here to talk to you 
about this evening. 
• This is a revised version of a speech delivered at the Journal of Law Reform Alumni 
Banquet, February 21, 1981, Ann Arbor, Michigan. 
** Michigan State Representative, 57th District; a recipient of the first annual Univer-
sity of Michigan Journal of Law Reform Award. 
** • Health Care Legislative Analyst, Michigan House Democratic Research Staff. 
1 1939 Mich. Pub. Acts No. 108 (repealed 1980). MICH. CoMP. LAws § 550.315 (1970) 
(repealed 1980) defines the Blues as a "charitable and benevolent institution" and grants 
it tax-exempt status. · 
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I. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
A. Background 
Health care costs have increased from 6.2 percent of the Gross 
National Product in 1965 to 9.1 percent in 1978. The rate of 
growth of health care expenditures is twice the Consumer Price 
Index, and Michigan's costs are among the highest in the nation. 
These cost spirals are a function of the premise that the health 
care industry does not respond to traditional market incentives. 
Health care is removed from the market because the providers 
control the demand and utilization of facilities, drugs, and other 
services. Generally, consumers are ignorant of the range of 
health services, have no comparative price information, and usu-
ally seek out services when they are ill or in crisis and unable to 
evaluate and judge the services rendered by health care profes-
sionals. Health care providers, having escaped the competitive 
marketplace, have been reimbursed on a cost-plus basis. There 
are, therefore, no incentives to contain costs. With over ninety 
percent of all Michigan health care expenses covered by third 
party payors, 1 neither the physician nor the consumer have any 
out-of-pocket economic incentive to economize. As costs escalate 
at faster and faster rates, those without insurance are forced out 
of the health care market. 
It was with this in mind that Representative Perry Bullard 
and I first introduced legislation in 1977. Representative Bui-
lard's bill was a major restructuring of Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 
while my bills8 would have required that the Blues Board con-
form to the Open Meetings Act.• While none of these bills 
moved in that session of the Legislature, significant public inter-
est was stimulated. A consensus was developing that the 1939 
statutes needed major revision. 
In an October 1978 ruling, the Michigan Supreme Court in 
Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Michigan v. Demlow5 ruled that the 
• Hospital, surgical, regular medical, and major medical insurance covered 93.9%, 
94.5%, 96.5%, and 68.6% of the Michigan population, respectively. Nationally, the re-
spective percentages were 82.5%, 79.8%, and 77.5% with major medical data unavail-
able. These estimates are based on 1974 data of persons under 65 covered by private 
insurance. MICHIGAN STATE HEALTH PLANNING ADVISORY COUNCIL & OFFICE OF HEALTH 
AND MEDICAL AFFAIRS, NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE 59 (1977). 
• H.R. 5450, 79th Sess. (Mich. 1977) (Bullard); H.R. 5295, 79th Sess. (Mich. 1977); 
H.R. 5296, 79th Sess. (Mich. 1977) (Hollister). 
• MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. §§ 15.261-.275 (Supp. 1980). 
• 403 Mich. 399, 270 N.W.2d 845 (1978). 
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Insurance Commissioner had differing degrees of control over 
Blue Cross and Blue Shield even though the two distinct pro-
grams had been organizationally consolidated through legislation 
in 1974. The Blues management was not opposed to legislation. 
In the spring of 1979, the Blues management came to Represen-
tative William Ryan and me requesting us to introduce their 
version of a rewrite of P.A. 108 & 109.• Representative Ryan 
sponsored and I co-sponsored a bill7 which, upon introduction, 
was referred to the House Insurance Committee for considera-
tion. During the first hearing, the committee room was packed 
with groups insisting that the legislature reject the incremental, 
patchwork approach contained in the Blues draft and work in-
stead to reform and reorganize fundamentally the Blues. It be-
came apparent that the restructuring of the Blues and the initia-
tion of cost containment were to become the major consumer 
issues to face the 79th Session of the Michigan Legislature. 
It was clear that the Blues proposal to address minimal, incre-
mental reform was dead. Within days after the first Insurance 
Committee hearing, the Insurance Commissioner, the Attorney 
General and the Citizens Lobby came forward with different 
versions of legislation fundamentally reorganizing Blue Cross/ 
Blue Shield. Representative Ryan and I co-sponsored all of the 
proposals, and began the process of building the public support 
necessary to enact the legislation. We agreed to use the Attorney 
General's draft as the vehicle bill8 to address the issues raised in 
the committee meeting and at hearings with various interest 
groups. 
B. The Major Goals of the Legislation 
As we began to refine the legislation, it was important to artic-
ulate the basic goals of any reform legislation. Based on my 
knowledge of the Blues and the testimony from the first hearing, 
it was apparent that legislation would have to achieve at least 
the following goals. First, the legislation would have to restruc-
ture the Board of Directors in order to make the Board more 
representative of and accountable to the various constituencies. 
One way to do this, it seemed, would be to reduce the control of 
• 1939 Mich. Pub. Acts Nos. 108-09 (repealed 1980). Public Act 109 provides the 
framework for supervision and regulation of nonprofit hospital service corporations in 
Michigan. 
• H.R. 4340, 79th Sees. (Mich. 1979). 
• H.R. 4555, 79th Sees. (Mich. 19_79). 
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the providers and give operational control to subscribers, malc-
ing a representative selection of the Board more open. Another 
step would be to reduce the size of the Board and provide mini-
mum safeguards for conduct of Board operations. Second, the 
legislation would have to make cost containment a central 
theme. Third, the internal operations of the Blues would have to 
be streamlined. The 1939 statute needed to be updated to reflect 
the realities of 1980, and to remedy the administrative problems 
raised by Demlow.9 Overall, the internal operations of the Blues 
would have to be more responsive and sensitive to subscribers. 
As a final goal of the legislation, the power of the Insurance 
Commissioner would have to be clarified. 
C. The Politics of Reform 
Most bills of the complexity involved here talce five to seven 
years to shepard through the legislative process. To do this in 
one session - two years - was i major challenge. It required 
establishing a broad-based coalition of interest groups, consum-
ers and agencies of state government. To organize and undertalce 
the task, Insurance Committee Chair Matthew McNeely estab-
lished a three-member subcommittee in the spring of 1978, of 
which I was an ad-hoc member. At approximately the same 
time, two different coalitions coalesced as work began on the 
bill. The first was known as the "Reform Coalition." The Re-
form Coalition was composed of consumer groups (Michigan 
Legal Services, Citizens for Better Care, the UAW, AFL-CIO, 
Michigan Citizens Lobby, Michigan Catholic Conference, and 
the Area Agencies on Aging Association) and state departments 
(Attorney General, Insurance Commissioner, Office of Health 
and Medical Affairs). 
The Reform Coalition, at the direction of the subcommittee, 
worked during the summer -to synthesize the four consumer-
oriented bills into one and to resolve and minimize differences 
with representatives from the Blues. In August, the Reform Coa-
lition presented their rough draft, House Bill 4555, 'to the 
subcommittee. 
The subcommittee began intensive deliberations on the bill. 
The Reform coalition sent representatives to all subcommittee 
meetings in the House where the bill was laboriously reworked 
one line and one page at a time. Together, with input from sev-
• 403 Mich. 399, 270 N.W.2d 845 (1978). 
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eral Blues management representatives, the Coalition worked to 
develop a comprehensive reform bill that was fair to Blue Cross/ 
Blue Shield. As the Coalition members participated in the draft-
ing, they also developed "ownership" of the bill by becoming ac-
tively involved in the legislative process to pass the bill. 
The second group was known as the "Shelton Coalition." 
While the Reform Coalition was spending months working to 
clarify language and refine policy, the Speaker asked Jack 
Shelton of Ford Motor Company to reconvene the Cost Contain-
ment Coalition and tackle the linchpin of language and policy, 
the method and level of reimbursement to providers by the 
Blues. This Coalition was made up of the Big Three Auto Com-
panies (General Motors, Ford, Chrysler), the UAW and AFL-
CIO, and members of Blue Cross/ Blue Shield of Michigan 
(BCBSM). Contributing as technical advisors, but not voting 
participants, were members of the Medical Society and Hospital 
Association. Jack Shelton worked diligently to separate his task 
- a cost containment scheme - from t~e rest of the bill. The 
final product, Section V, stood independently from the rest of 
the bill and consequently avoided the controversy involved in 
the Board restructuring and corporate powers sections. Shelton 
formulated a unique compromise designed to allow the free mar~ 
ket place to work while allowing governmental intervention if 
the Blues and the providers failed to achieve their goals regard-
ing access to reasonably priced, quality care. 
When Shelton completed his work, he elicited and obtained 
the support of the Medical Society, the Hospital Association, 
and the Nurses Association for Section V - the only section 
that they were really interested in. They became advocates for 
the reform, a very important accomplishment. With all the pro-
viders supporting Section V and staying neutral on the rest of 
the bill, the Blues had no major interest group to turn to as they 
tried to stop passage of the legislation. 
Slowly and deliberately, we went through the drafting of the 
bill. An early summer deadline faded to early fall. Finally, the 
bill began to take shape. Section by section of the bill fell into 
place as the coalition labored to negotiate a final and equitable 
version. The Blues tried to delay. They continuously raised is-
sues and questions, never attending a meeting without eight to 
fourteen experts and staff. 
When the House Insurance Committee received the subcom-
mittee's work and prepared to report the bill to .the full House, 
the Blues asked that over eighty amendments be considered. All 
of the amendments failed. The bill had been thoughtfully devel-
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oped and the various coalition members were informed and ac-
tively supporting the negotiated version. To have adopted the 
amendments would have been a betrayal of the process and the 
coalition's efforts to construct the bill. The bill quickly moved 
from the Insurance Committee to the full House where it passed 
by a vote of ninety-five to seven. It then moved to the Senate for 
deliberation. 
In the Senate, the Blues focused their opposition to the Board 
restructuring issues, and worked to break the coalition that had 
supported the bill in the House. Quietly and secretly, they went 
to every member of the Reform Coalition and the special inter-
ests (Medical Society, Hospital Association), talking with them 
about the issues they lost in the year-long negotiations. Having 
identified those losses, the Blues drafted a version of the bill 
that would more accurately reflect their interest and that was 
designed to "buy". the support of others. The Blues had three 
objectives: (1) to make the bill more palatable; (2) to break the 
powerful coalition which had drafted and lobbied for the House 
versio~ of the bill; and (3) to dilute the reform contained in the 
bill to make it the least progressive possible. 
Unfortunately, they were successful. In a move which as-
tounded most observors, they were able to garner the votes in 
the Commerce Committee to have their own draft replace the 
House draft on which the Commerce Committee had deliberated 
for several months. The sixty-plus-page Blues-drafted version 
was adopted at one meeting despite the fact that several com-
mittee members had not even been given the opportunity to 
read the Blues' draft before voting. Thus, the Senate began con-
sideration on the Blues' draft. It appeared that all the work in 
the House was lost. The coalition was broken; the Blues were in 
the driver's seat. Attempts to modify incrementally the bill in 
Committee and on the Senate floor were moderately successful, 
but the bill remained a far different version than the consumer-
oriented bill that passed the House: After several days of floor 
debate, during which over forty amendments were vociferously 
disputed, the Senate passed the bill on July 3, 1980, with a vote 
of twenty-six to nine. · 
When the bill returned to the House, we rejected it immedi-
ately by a vote of seventy-seven to five and sent it to a Confer-
ence Committee. Before the Conference were two distinct ver-
sions of reform - one written by a consumer coalition in an 
open, deliberate process, and another written by the entity to be 
regulated, the Blues, after secretive meetings with various ele-
ments of the coalition. The Conference lasted four months and 
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the final draft was somewhere between the House and Senate 
version. Surprisingly, however, the Blues were still not support-
ing the bill because they had not been able to win the Board 
restructuring issues. The absolute bottom line always was man-
agement control of the Board; we continuously won that battle. 
Slowly we rebuilt the coalition, and slowly the bill came back 
together. The Conference Committee completed its reconcilia-
tion of the disparate bills and reported it to the House for con-
sideration, where it was adopted on December 4, 1980. The next 
day the bill passed the Senate and was sent to the Governor for 
his signature. On December 29, 1980, the Governor signed the 
bill, making it Public Act No. 350.10 
II. P.A. 350 - ESSENTIALS OF REFORM 
A. Board Structure 
First, P.A. 350, the "Nonprofit Health Care Corporation Re-
form Act" ( the "Act") reorganizes the Board of Directors to no 
more than thirty-five voting members,11 a reduction from forty-
seven members. Four of the directors would be public members, 
two of whom would be retirees. UI Of the remainder, at least sev-
enty-five percent must be subscribers and no more than twenty-
five percent could be providers. 18 (The Blues Board at present 
has forty-seven members: twenty-five subscriber representatives, 
nineteen provider members, two public members appointed by 
the Insurance Commissioner, and the President of the Corpora-
tion. However, because some of the twenty-five subscribers also 
have health care provider ties, such as a trustee of a hospital, 
many groups have argued that Board members with provider al-
legiance currently hold majority control.) 
Under the Act, the Board is reorganized to represent more 
fairly various constituencies - providers and subscribers; group 
and individual subscribers; large, medium, and small groups; 
and employers and employees. The actual selection process is 
not dictated by the Act, but is left to the Blue Cross bylaws14 · 
•• 1980 Mich. Pub. Act.a No. 350 (codified at Mice. CoMP. LAws ANN. §§ 550.1101-
.1704 (Mich. Legis. Serv. 1980)). 
11 Id. § 301(1) (MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 550.1301(1)). 
11 Id. § 301(2) (Mice. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 550.1301(2)). 
11 Id. § 301(3) (Mice. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 550.1301(3)). 
" Id. § 301(6) (Mice. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 550.1301(6)). 
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which are to be written by the current Board of Directors. 111 
Open meetings are not required, and certain sensitive material 
need not be included in the minutes of the Board meetings. 
The Act required that Board action have the support of the 
majority of members serving (sixteen affirmative votes) on key 
issues such as rate revisions and provider contr~cts. 18 The pur-
poses of this provision are: (1) assure subscriber control; (2) re-
quire board action to have the genuine support of the Board; (3) 
prevent a small minority from ·taking action opposed by the vast 
majority; and (4) to protect against conflicts of interest when 
providers must vote on their own methods and rates of 
reimbursement. 
The basic philosophy behind this section is that the Board 
ought to be broadly representative and responsive to various 
constituencies. Thus, subscribers ought to have a role in deter-
mining the actions and policies of Blue Cross. It is important to 
note that, unlike private insurance companies which are ac-
countable to their shareholders, Blue Cross is a non-profit corpo-
ration and does not have shareholders. Its accountability ought 
to be predominately to its subscribers and, secondarily, to the 
public. 
The Act provides for this accountability. In addition to the 
restructuring of the Board, it provides for Board action to be 
open to subscriber scrutiny. It is proper and reasonable that 
subscribers have the ability to know how their representatives 
on the Board are voting on important items, and what decisions 
the Board is making. 
The Act does not, however, require open meetings. Unfortu-
nately the Blues argued successfully that too much ope~ess 
would put them at a competitive disadvantage and be harmful 
in recruiting potential Board members. Instead of open meet-
ings, the Board is required to keep minutes of its meetings.17 
Record roll call votes are required upon the request of any five 
Board members.18 Any subscriber can request minutes through a 
Board member.19 
The Blues found this section of the Reform Act to be the most 
dangerous and threatening. They agree with a smaller, sub-
scriber-controlled Board but they violently oppose roll call votes, 
recorded minutes, accountability to subscriber constituencies, 
11 Id. § 302(1) (MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 550.1302(1)). 
18 Id. § 303(4)(c) (MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 550.1303(4)(c)). 
17 Id. § 304(1) (MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 550.1304(1)). 
18 Id. § 303(5) (MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 550.1303(5)). 
•• Id. § 304(1) (MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 550.1304(1)). 
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public members, and the absolute majority voting provisions. 
Taken together, they allege that the provisions hamper their 
operations and cripple the Board's ability to function. 
To the Reform Coalition, this section was essential to any re-
form. Without some degree of openness and accountability, it is 
business as usual. Any public body can decry openness, but it is 
a fundamental component of accountability as are record roll 
call votes. Even though complete openness and complete roll call 
votes on all issues were lost in the negotiations on the bill, the 
legislation maintains a major policy commitment to openness 
and accountability. 
B. Regulation and Cost Containment 
When it came to cost containment, there were two diametri-
cally opposing views which came into play. On one end of the 
spectrum were those arguing for a state-controlled rate-setting 
mechanism which simply dictated costs and initiated controls. 
On the other end of the spectrum were those who advocate4 the 
free marketplace, eliminating all governmental regulation and 
letting the Blues and the providers figure ways to limit growth. 
Months went by as the debate raged. Finally, Speaker Bobby 
Crim asked Jack Shelton of the Cost Containment Coalition to 
develop a strategy on cost containment. He had been successful 
earlier in developing Michigan's Bed Reduction Legislation. The 
final strategy developed by the Shelton Coalition was a creative 
compromise encompassing both aspects_ of the diverse opinions. 
First, the Act establishes three goals for health care: (1) rea-
sonable access; (2) reasonable cost; and (3) quality health care 
services. The cost goal is designed to assµre a rate of growth that 
does not exceed the compound rate of inflation and real eco-
nomic growth. 
To achieve these three goals, the Blues negotiate a Provider 
Class Plan with each of the provider groups (as defined by Blue 
Cross/Blue Shield)-physicians, hospitals, pharmacies, et cetera. 
The Plan must address access, quality, and cost containment. 
The Plan is operable for two years, without governmental in-
volvement or interference. ff after two years the goals are met, 
the government continues to have a passive monitoring role and 
the Blues negotiate a further plan or continue the existing plan. 
The scheme here is simple. ff the Blues can successfully work 
with the providers to meet their goals and limit the growth of 
costs, the free market will go forward without governmental in-
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terf erence. If, on the other hand, the goals are not met, and one 
of the goals is violated, the Insurance Commissioner triggers a 
mechanism of review and rewriting of the Plan. Essentially, the 
Plan calls for governmental intervention if the free market fails. 
In the event the Plan fails, and for certain decisions which the 
Commissioner may exercise, an elaborate appeal mechanism is 
established to hear appeals. 
It is true that Blue Cross has begun to progress towards con-
taining costs, especially in the case of the prospective reimburse-
ment system with hospitals. The Act gives Blue Cross additional 
cost restraint powers. If they are able to achieve cost contain-
ment there will be no governmental involvement; this section 
will result in less regulation than has historically been the case 
for Blue Cross. 
The Act substantially adopts the provisions of the Shelton Co-
alition. Every major provider group and consumer group has 
supported this section. It was estimated that over $137 million 
would have been saved if these provisions had been in effect the 
past four years. 
One legitimate criticism is that there will be cost containment 
goals for Blue Cross, but not for private insurance companies. In 
part, this is because Blue Cross has such a substantial share of 
the market (over sixty-five percent) that it only makes sense 
first to establish goals for Blue Cross. Furthermore, Blue Cross/ 
Blue Shield of Michigan is the only corporation to which the 
Legislature has granted the privilege and authority to contract 
directly with providers of health care. But in addition, this will 
aid Blue Cross' competitive position - lower payments to prov-
iders means lower rates to subscribers; this could greatly benefit 
Blue Cross. 
C. Improving Internal Operations 
Especially in the last ten to twelve years, significant questions 
over the powers of Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Michigan have 
arisen. Many of these questions have ended up in court resulting 
in great expenditures of time, money, and energy. The Legisla-
ture felt it was important to define, as much as possible, exactly 
what Blue Cross can and cannot do.so As a result, many provi-
sions of corporate law are inserted directly in P.A. 350, and with 
these provisions carry any case law developed over the years. 
•
0 See id. § 207 (Mica. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 550.1207). 
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Other sections of corporate law had no applicability to Blue 
Cross and were not included in the Act. But in virtually every 
case where Blue Cross asked for and offered a rationale for in-
cluding a section of corporate law in P.A. 350, it was included. 
Rather than place a burden on Blue Cross, this should aid them 
by reducing the number of court cases they are needlessly in-
volved in. 
The Act significantly increases the ability of Blue Cross/Blue 
Shield of Michigan to off er their customers and subscribers ser-
vices which they desire. Blue Cross is now given explicit power 
in the areas of cost saving services, experimental health · care 
projects, governmental services, Health Maintenance Organiza-
tions (HMO), et cetera. In other areas, governmental regulation 
is reduced or eliminated (e.g., some areas of provider contracts, 
rate regulation, and reserves). This should add to Blue Cross' 
flexibility and ability to respond to the market. 
1. Rates- The Act revises the rate approval process for Blue 
Cross. In some areas, the authority of the Insurance Commis-
sioner is reduced from that of current law, in other areas current 
law is clarified, and in a few areas, the authority of the Commis-
sioner is increased. We believe that this area of P.A. 350 will 
result in a better rate procedure-one resulting in more timely 
rate approval. (One could hardly imagine a less timely process 
than current law, which has allowed a 1978 filing to drag on 
without an end in sight). 
a. Intervention- The Act provides that upon receipt of a rate 
filing, the Insurance Commissioner must notify "interested per-
sons" of the filing.11 If "the interested person or any other per-
son on whose behalf the interested person is acting is aggrieved 
by the proposed rate change," and if the Commissioner agrees 
that the person is, in fact, aggrieved (or reasonably might be), 
that person is entitled to a hearing. 11 The hearing procedure 
parallels the Administrative Procedures Act.18 The Legislature 
received testimony that aggrieved persons have a constitutional 
right to this kind of a procedure and that failure to provide this 
kind of process in P.A. 350 would result in almost certain (and 
undoubtedly, successful) legal challenge. There are standards for 
intervention, and the procedure specified in the Act is orderly, 
timely, and fair to both the aggrieved persons and Blue Cross. It 
should also be noted that many areas are exempted from prior 
•• Id. § 612 (MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 550.1612). 
11 Id. § 613 (MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 550.1613). 
11 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 24.201 (1970). 
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approval by the Commissioner (e.g. collective bargaining agree-
ments,24 national accounts/111 mandated benefits26) - a regula-
tory reduction from current law. 
b. Relationship to other private insurers- Individual com-
mercial health insurance policies are subject to regulatory review 
and approval for both the rates and the form (policy). Though 
hearings on such policies are held infrequently, if a company or 
affected party requested a hearing, it would be held. Similarly, 
the Act does not mandate hearings; it provides a procedure for 
holding hearings in the event that a hearing is requested. The 
purpose of a hearing is not to provide "interminable delay" in 
rate decisions, but to afford due process on rate decisions as out-
lined in the Administrative Procedures Act. When considering 
the frequency with which hearings are held, one must bear in 
mind the relationship with market share. For example, Blue 
Cross provides Other-than-Group Complementary and Group 
Complementary coverage (wrap-around Medicare benefits) to 
over seventy percent of Michigan's seniors. When such a large 
percent of the population is affected by one corporation, it is 
reasonable to expect that parties will be interested in the out-
come of rate decisions. 
c. Interim relief- It is important to note that current law 
does not provide for interim rates - under any circumstances! 
The Act provides mandatory interim rate increases requested by 
the Corporation in the case of a delay in a rate filing approval.17 
This would happen when there is probable cause to believe that 
an underwriting loss would occur without the interim relief.18 
For the first time, interim rates are permitted. 
d. Senior citizens' rates- The Act does permit (but does not 
require) the Corporation to establish cost transfers to benefit se-
nior citizen subscribers.19 This is important, because at retire-
ment seniors suffer a drastic income reduction. Seniors have 
paid their dues into our society and should be allowed to live the 
rest of their . days without being in constant fear that illness 
could wipe them out. In any event, P.A. 350 gives Blue Cross 
authority in this area, without any requirements. 
In summary, the Act provides for a reasonable and orderly 
14 1980 Mich. Pub. Acts No. 350, § 606(2) (codified at MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 
550.1607(2) (Mich. Legis. Serv. 1980)) . 
.. Id. § 608(5) (MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 550.1608(5)). 
08 Id. § 608(4) (MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 550.1608(4)) . 
.., Id. § 614(1) (MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 550.1614(1)). 
u Id. § 614(2) (MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 550.1614(2)). 
" Id. § 609(5) (MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 550.1609(5)). 
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process for rate approval. There are provisions for intervention, 
which is required by due process, and necessary to allow ag-
grieved parties to have an opportunity to present their case. 
This procedure should result in fairer and more timely rates. 
2. Benefits- The current statute provides for prior and peri-
odic approval of benefits and rates by the Insurance Commis-
sioner for all contracts involving both Blue Cross and any other 
commerical health insurer. The Act reduces the Commissioner's 
statutory authority in this area for the Blues, especially in the 
case of collectively bargained agreements;80 however, historically, 
Commissioners have not exercised this authority over collec-
tively bargained benefits because of the operation of the in-
formed buyer concept in the case of collectively bargained 
benefits. 
Benefits· and rates offered by commercial insurers are subject 
to approval by the Commissioner. Though a 1968 order ex-
empted group benefits from such approval, every individual 
health insurance policy and rate is reviewed and approved by 
the Commissioner. 
A provision on comprehensiveness of benefits is included to 
provide protection for the public. Many individuals and small 
groups have no market power to influence the decisions of 
BCBSM regarding benefit levels and accessibility. A case in 
point is the decision by BCBSM to limit the offering of coverage 
to the medicare eligible; this action was set aside by court order. 
BCBSM does "not think they should be forced to offer any 
benefits by law." The Legislature disagrees. Commercial insurers 
are required to offer coverage for prosthetic devices as well as for 
treatment for alcoholism and substance abuse. 81 In addition, 
P.A. 350 merely requires Blue Cross to offer or include, at an 
additional cost, prosthetic coverage so that those who wish to 
purchase such additional coverage may.81 This section on bene-
fits actually reduces the authority of the Insurance 
Commissioner! 
3. Contingency reserves- Currently, the Insurance Commis-
sioner has the right to regulate all reserves; reserves shall be 
maintained "in such form and amount as the commissioner of 
insurance may determine."88 Although unclear, it appears that 
total BCBSM reserves equaled about $800 million as of Decem-
ao Id. § 607(2) (MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 550.1607(2)). 
•• Id. § 414(1) (MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 550.1414(1)). 
u Id. § 415 (MlcH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 550.1415). 
u MlcH. CoMP. LAws § 550.509 (1970). 
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her 31, 1978 (total premiums were $2.13 billion). The major item 
of controversy is contingency reserves, which amounted to $275 
million. 
The Act spells out in great detail the level of contingency 
reserves and how the various lines of business will .contribute to 
them. 84 An initial target of 11.5 percent of income is set with a 
range of seven to fourteen percent. 811 The reserves may fluctuate 
within this range. However, when they exceed the fourteen per-
cent, the Blues must make adjustments to bring them nearer the 
target. 86 The target and range are permitted to shift over time as 
the distribution of Blues business becomes more or less risky. In 
addition, the portion of rates which is to be contributed toward 
contingency reserves is clearly and equitably specified amongst 
all lines of business. 
It is important to note that current Blue Cross policy is to 
target contingency reserves at 12.5 percent. This target was es-
tablished in 1977, prior to implementation of an experience rat-
ing system which has subsequently reduced substantially the 
risk assumed by the corporation, by providing for retrospective 
premium adjustments for certain groups (over forty percent of 
their business)! 
There is a need for prudent contingency reserves, and P.A. 
350 recognizes that need. But it also recognizes that these 
reserves are funded by subscribers' money; thus excessive 
reserves are inappropriate. Reserves are funded by, and belong 
to, subscribers. Higher reserves mean higher premiums, which 
may not be justified. Lower reserves can result in lower premi-
ums, which should improve the competitive posture of Blue 
Cross! 
4. Investments- It is important to remember that since 
BCBSM has no stockholders, money available for investment by 
Blue Cross belongs to its subscribers. Thus, it is essential that 
investments be prudent and safe. The investment section paral-
lels that of domestic commercial life insurance companies, but 
also allows up to two percent of assets to be invested in "ven-
ture capital" in Michigan-based operations.87 With the "venture 
capital" section, the Committee recognized the value of some 
more risky investments both to the state's economy and to the 
corporation in the form of increased yields for the corporation . 
.. 1980 Mich. Pub. Acts No. 350, § 205 (codified at MlcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 550.1205 
(Mich. Legis. Serv. 1980)). 
aa Id. § 205(9) (MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 550.1205(9)) . 
.. Id. 
•• Id. § 206(3) (MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 550.1206(3)). 
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Yet it is important that these more risky investments not be 
large enough to result in a potential loss of a substantial portion 
of reserves. 
The Act would permit investments such as Trapper's Alley 
and the Chrysler loan. P.A. 350's investment provisions are rea-
sonable, workable, and flexible. 
5. Safeguarding competitive data- Through the Freedom of 
Information Act,88 the Legislature has determined that all gov-
ernmental records should be subject to public inspection unless 
there is a compelling reason for their privacy. This Act contains 
specific exemptions for the release of certain information (e.g. 
trade secrets, personal information, etc., would be exempt from 
disclosure), and any material filed by Blue Cross with the Insur-
ance Commissioner would be subject to these exemptions. In ad-
dition, certain provider reimbursement data would be exempted 
from disclosure under specific conditions. 89 
The question of the release of information filed by Blue Cross 
with the Insurance Commissioner has been the subject of pro-
tracted litigation. The Court of Appeals has ruled the BCBSM 
filings are subject to the Freedom of Information Act and their 
filings to date have not contained bona fide trade secrets;'0 
It is important to note that other corporations, including in-
surance companies, file similar kinds of information or more sen-
sitive kinds of information, and are also subject to the Freedom 
of Information Act. In the case of casualty insurers, for example: 
"Every insurer shall file with the commissioner every manual of 
classification, every manual of rules and rates, every rating plan 
and every modification of any of the foregoing .... "u This in-
formation is public. 
a. Competitive position- It has been alleged that release of 
this information would harm the competitive position of Blue 
Cross. First, it is important to look at the overall competitive 
position of Blue Cross under P.A. 350. It is estimated that 
BCBSM currently has about a fourteen percent competitive ad-
vantage over private insurance companies which results from 
special legislative privileges such as hospital discounts and tax 
exemptions. Other sections of this Act result in an improvement 
in Blue Cross's advantage . 
.. MlcH. CoMP. LAws ANN. §§ 15.231-.246 (Supp. 1980). 
•• 1980 Mich. Pub. Acts No. 350, § 604 (codified at MlcH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 550.1604 
(Mich. Legis. Serv. 1980)). 
•• Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Michigan v. Insurance Bureau Hearing Officer, Nos. 
46857, 52454, 52714, 52485, slip op. at 10-13 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 3, 1981). 
" MICH. COMP. LAWS § 500.2406(1) (1970). 
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Second, in other cases where detailed information has been 
filed by a company, other companies have not, as a rule, re-
quested access to it. This may be because much of this informa-
tion is already generally available to the Blues' competitors 
through other sources, e.g., other subscribers, professional socie-
ties, other governmental bodies, other companies with which 
Blue Cross contracts, et cetera. This disclosure will not substan-
tially affect Blue Cross' competitive position. In fact, the third 
party reimburser that has used the Freedom of Information Act 
the most to gain information is BCBSM via requests to the In-
surance Bureau on commerical health insurance policies and 
rates. Court decisions have ruled the BCBS has failed to demon-
strate that this information may be classified as trade secrets.'41 
b. Need for information- The Act establishes explicit, objec-
tive, and detailed standards for rate approval. For the Insurance 
Commissioner to make a judgment regarding the legality of the 
proposed rates, or for an interested person to determine if he or 
she would like to challenge the proposed rates, this information 
is essential. 
In summary, information established as "trade secrets" would 
be exempt from disclosure, as would personal information, cer-
tain provider reimbursement data, and any other information 
exempted by the Freedom of Information Act.48 It has not been 
demonstrated that disclosure of any additional information will 
have a detrimental effect on either the Blues' competitive posi-
tion or cost containment goals. It is an important legislative 
principle, however, that records filed with the government be 
available to the public, unless there is a compelling reason which 
overrides the principle of public access to information. 
D. The Blues Pulled Out All the Stops - And Continue the 
Fight 
Throughout the legislative history of this bill, the Blues have 
spared no expense to slow, stop or modify this legislation. In the 
early stages of the session, the Blues made a $50 million loan to 
Chrysler. Even though it has proven to be a questionable busi-
ness loan, it did have the effect of taking some of the vigor out 
of organized labor's agressive pro-consumer advocacy. Later in 
•• Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Michigan v. Insurance Bureau Hearing Officer, Nos. 
46857, 52454, 52714, 52485, slip op. at 10-13 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 3, 1981). 
•• 1980 Mich. Pub. Acts No. 350, § 604 (codified at MlcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 550.1604 
(Mich. Legis. Serv. 1980). 
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the session, when the Lansing HMO was in danger of going 
bankrupt, the Blues stepped in and bought it out for $5 million. 
Also, the Blues sent a letter to every Michigan bank offering de-
posits of Bloes funds in exchange for their subscriber business, a 
rebating practice which is explicitly outlawed for commeric&l in-
surers under chapter 20 of the Insurance Code. During Senate 
consideration, the Blues guaranteed a $3.5 million loan which al-
lowed the new Detroit Receiving Hospital to open. Though these 
decisions often benefited the public, they also served the Blues 
well. 
The Blues bought radio time and advertised extensively. They 
bought billboards, radio and television ads, and full page news-
paper ads. The newspaper advertisements directly attacked the 
pending legislation. The full page advertisements were repro-
duced and mailed to Blues subscribers. At one point the Blues 
even purchased a full page advertisement in a national weekly 
news magazine. Besides these expenses, the Blues hired experts 
from all over the country to testify against the pending legisla-
tion. The Blues had three people representing them at every 
meeting, plus eight to fourteen support people who were present 
to speak on any specific aspect of the legislation. No one has yet 
volunteered information on the cost of the opposition, which 
ultimately must be funded by subscribers through premium 
dollars. 
Against this barrage of wealth and expertise, I would bring a 
group of senior citizen activists who inevitably would neutralize 
the presence and testimony of the Blues' hired guns. Overall, the 
seniors were more effective and believable than the hired experts 
the Blues brought forward. 
After three years, hundreds of hours and mountains of paper 
work and amendments, H.R. 4555 became P.A. 350 of 1980. As a 
token for my efforts, the bill was to take effect on April 3, 1981, 
my birthday. On April 2, however, the Ingham County Circuit 
Court, responding to a petition by Blue Cross to enjoin the Act, 
placed a temporary restraining order against the law preventing 
its enforcement until a number of questions of law and constitu-
tionality can be answered ... 
So now the arena has shifted from the Legislature to the 
courts. I only hope that the courts can withstand the enormous 
power and wealth which the Blues will bring to bear, and allow 
this important consumer legislation to stand. 
" Detroit News, Apr. 3, 1981, at 3A, col. 1. 

